Good evening.
In the Divinity School Library there is a book titled Who's who in hell: a
handbook and international directory for humanists, freethinkers, naturalists,
rationalists, and non-theists. In the hopes of being added to the next edition,
I've taken the liberty of composing an entry for myself. It reads:
Christopher Kirchhoff -- In elementary school, asked Pastor too many
questions during children's sermon. During confirmation classes, failed to fully
appreciate church doctrine. In college, twice argued against God's existence,
even after house struck by lightening during summer of 1996. Also took Moral
Reasoning 54 with Prof. Jay Harris and decided that all was permitted.
At the risk of eternal damnation, Shankar and I are here to take issue with
the idea that a belief in God is justified. From the very beginning, we had a
suspicion that something about God, in my case, and the gods, in Shankar's case,
was a bit fishy. Before we explain why, I would like to advise that you to
fasten your seatbelt. The rhetorical ride from here on out might be a bit rough.
Shankar and I do not observe the 11th commandment: thou shall not question.
Instead, we treat religion with great suspicion, and often times moral
condemnation.
We are here this evening to argue that there is no rational justification for
a belief in God. Many Christian seem to agree with us. Pastors, priests, and
other clergy spend hours preaching about the virtues of believing on faith, how
great it is, and what wonderful rewards await those who care the least about
having reasons for their beliefs.
We hold that faith itself is immoral, and that theistic religions, however
well meaning, are castles built on foundations of sand.
A benevolent God, it seems to us, is not only an implausible construction in
logical terms, but also an unnecessary and insufficient explanation of the
world. Instead, it seems that the notion of a benevolent creator who intervenes
to, say, help the Israelites win battles, arose to fulfill the needs of a
particular people at a certain time. The notion has hung on for reasons easy to
understand. However, justifying God's existence in advanced scientific society
is an arduous task.
We no longer consult Genesis for knowledge about natural history. Nor do the
astronomers take advice from the Pope on whether or not the earth goes round the
sun or vice-versa. And despite the efforts of thousands of promoters of the
supernatural and the entire Fox TV network, miracles have all turned either to
be bogus, unverified or to have less than miracles explanations. As a result,
many Christian theologians have retreated from making claims about the natural
world. Instead, they offer religion as a guide to living in it, justifying God's
existence on believers' experience of God in their lives.
But this approach has also run into problems. Reasons for God-beliefs have
been plainly elucidated. The single most robust indicator of one's religious
belief, for example, is the religious belief of one's parents. Religious
fundamentalism correlates negatively with level of education, income, and
scientific literacy, leading to the conclusion that fundamentalism is, to some
degree, a product of ignorance. And psychologists have uncovered mechanisms
underlying the propagation of religious belief, including the effects of
socialization, social support and coping structures, stereotyped response
sequences, and fundamental motivators such as the fulfillment of authoritarian
needs and the reduction of anxiety.
In the eyes of many, the social-scientific study of God-beliefs have matured
to a point at which comprehensive explanations demonstrate no distinction need
be made between religion and other types of human experience. Perhaps the most
damaging evidence against the argument from religious experience comes from the
human brain. Preoccupation with religious matters, mystic episodes, and
sensitivity to religious symbols, terms or icons has been linked to activity
within the temporal lobe. In fact, spiritual experience can be artificially
induced in atheists and theists alike by stimulating certain regions of the
brain with electro-magnetic energy. If spiritual cognition can arise from
artificial means, it seems implausible to attribute the experience of God to an
external or divine source. Moreover, it has been found that personal religious
history influences what people see and feel in their electro-magnetically
induced God experiences. A Muslim raised in an Islamic society will likely see
Allah; a Christian, Jesus; a Jew, Yahweh; and so forth. One would be surprised
to hear of the Hindu god Shiva appearing to believers at Chartres.
That religious experiences are contingent upon one's background is
particularly salient to this evening's debate. If religion is historically
determined, religious experience cannot be uniquely authoritative. Believers
claiming authority from their own religious experience would have to grant the
same authority to others. This would quickly lead to a religious relativism
within which mutually exclusive claims could not be resolved. Unless God has
multiple personality disorder, it is hard to reconcile the diversity of
religious experience with a unique divinity.
In the face of all this, our opponents still hold on to a belief in God.
Attempting to show how an all-loving, infinitely good creator would allow
starvation and drought, the suffering of innocent children and infants, and the
worst of human horrors, is not an easy task. Instead of spending our time
attempting to square circles, Shankar and I hold that the idea of a benevolent
creator is an unnecessary and woefully complicated idea, that it is much simpler
and more reasonable to conclude that the universe is indifferent to human
sufferings and human joys, that life on earth is indeed a mixture of the two,
and that because arguments for a benevolent creator are incoherent, illogical,
and implausible, belief in such a God is unjustified.
BURDEN OF PROOF
We would also like to say a word about the burden of proof. Take, for
example, a person asserting that aliens molested them. Because an alien abductee
posits the existence of aliens, the burden of proof is clearly on them to
provide credible evidence that aliens exist. Eyewitness testimony or unverified
reports will not suffice. It is thus improper for the alien abductee to justify
his or her abduction on the grounds that it cannot be proven that aliens do not
exist. The logical possibility that aliens could exist is not sufficient
justification for the belief that anal probe-wielding little green men run
around abducting humans.